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STOCK REDEMPTIONS: THE
STANDARDS FOR QUALIFYING AS A
PURCHASE UNDER SECTION 302(b)*
DOUGLAS A. KAHN**
INTRODUCTION
A distribution from a corporation to its shareholders that is made
on account of the shareholders' stock holdings is commonly re-
ferred to as a "section 301 distribution" because such distributions are
dealt with primarily in section 301 of the Internal Revenue Code., In
certain circumstances, property received by a shareholder from a
corporation is treated the same as it would be if it had been distrib-
uted to the shareholder on account of his stock holding. To the extent
that property acquired by a shareholder is so characterized, the trans-
action is sometimes referred to as one treated as a section 301 distribu-
tion. For convenience, references herein to section 301 distributions
will include transactions treated as such.
The tax consequence of a shareholder's receiving a section 301
distribution depends upon the "earning and profits" (e and p) of the
distributing corporation at the time that the distribution was made.2
To the extent the distributing corporation had e and p at that time,3
the section 301 distribution will constitute a dividend which is treated
as ordinary income to the shareholder. 4 The amount of a section 301
distribution in excess of the e and p allocated thereto is treated as a
return of the shareholder's capital to the extent of his basis in the
stock, which basis is reduced by that amount.5 To the extent that the
* Certain background portions of this Article have been drawn from D. Kahn,
Basic Corporate Taxation (3d ed. 1981).
** Professor of Law, University of Michigan; B.A. 1955, University of North
Carolina; J.D. 1958, George Washington University.
I. I.R.C. § 301. Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 through the date of amendment by the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34 (codified in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.):
2. The term "earnings and profits" (e and p) is a term of art in tax law. In
general, it describes the maximum amount of corporate funds that can be distributed
to the corporation's shareholders without reducing the level of its capital-i.e., the
aggregate amount previously contributed to the corporation by shareholders. For an
explanation of the meaning of e and p, its allocation to § 301 distributions, and the
manner by which the amount of dividend income is determined, see D. Kahn, Basic
Corporate Taxation § 2.11-.16 (3d ed. 1981).
3. E and p can either be for the current taxable year or, alternatively, accumu-
lated since the corporation was formed. Only e and'p accumulated after February
28, 1913, however, is taken into account. I.R.C. § 316(a).
4. Id. §§ 301(c)(1), 316(a).
5. Id. § 301(c)(2).
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excess section 301 distribution is greater than the shareholder's basis in
his stock, the overage is treated as gain recognized from the sale of the
stock, typically a capital gain.6
In an attempt to withdraw funds from a closely held corporation
without incurring dividend treatment, the controlling shareholders
could cause the corporation to redeem some shares of their stock. Each
shareholder would then seek to report as gain only the difference
between the amount he received from the corporation and his basis in
the shares of stock surrendered. Typically that gain will be character-
ized as a long-term capital gain 7 if the shareholder has held the
surrendered stock for more than one year." Because there is no
substantive difference between a redemption made pro rata among
the shareholders and a section 301 distribution, the tax consequences
of both transactions should be the same.9 Therefore, except for par-
tial and complete liquidations10 and for certain redemptions of stock
6. Id. § 301(c) (3) (A). An exception to the above described treatment arises when
the distributing corporation has e and p accumulated from a period prior to March 1,
1913. I.R.C. § 301(c)(3)(B).
7. See Rev. Rul. 56-540, 1956-2 C.B. 177; Rev. Rul. 56-485, 1956-2 C.B. 176;
Rev. Rul. 56-183, 1956-1 C.B. 161.
8. I.R.C. § 1222(3). In addition to the "equivalent to a dividend" exception
discussed later in the text, see infra notes 78-132 and accompanying text, other
exceptions to capital gain treatment may apply-e.g., the collapsible corporation
provisions of § 341. One important exception involves the redemption of section 306
stock (a special type of stock). Subject to the exceptions set forth at § 306(b), the
entire amount received by a shareholder in redemption of section 306 stock, not
merely the amount received in excess of the shareholder's basis, is treated as a § 301
distribution to the shareholder. I.R.C. § 306(a)(2).
9. For example, assume that X Corporation had 120 shares of common stock
outstanding. A owned 60 shares, B owned 40 shares, and C owned 20 shares. Each
share had a value of $1,000; each shareholder had a basis of $200 in each share of his
stock; and X had accumulated e and p of $21,000. On June 4, X distributed $6,000 to
A in redemption of six of his shares of X; $4,000 to B in redemption of four of his
shares; and $2,000 to C in redemption of two of his shares. After the redemption, the
percentage of stock ownership of the three shareholders is identical to their percent-
age of ownership before the redemption- namely, 50% for A, 331/3 % for B, and
162/3 % for C. The effect of the redemption is to withdraw $12,000 from X without
changing the shareholder's interests.
10. A partial liquidation can occur when a corporation terminates one of several
actively conducted businesses and then distributes the assets of the terminated busi-
ness or the proceeds from the sale of such assets, or a combination thereof, in
redemption of some shares of its stock. I.R.C. § 346; Treas. Reg. § 1.346-1(b)(2)
(1955). A partial liquidation can also occur when the corporation contracts its
business and distributes the proceeds acquired from that contraction in redemption of
some of its shares of stock. For example, the distribution in redemption of the
insurance proceeds received on account of a fire that destroyed several floors of a
building owned and operated by a corporation was treated as a distribution in partial
liquidation. Imler v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 836 (1948), acq. 1949-1 C.B. 2; see Rev.
Rul. 74-296, 1974-1 C.B. 80 (department store corporation's elimination of most
departments and reduction of floor space, number of employees, inventory, fixed
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included in a decedent's gross estate," the tax law treats a pro rata
redemption as a section 301 distribution. Thus, the entire amount
received in redemption of the stock is treated as dividend income if the
corporation has adequate e and p.' 2 The shareholder's basis in the
redeemed shares is added to and apportioned among his remaining
shares of the corporation's stock. 13
Characterizing a perfectly pro rata redemption as a section 301
distribution is logically sound, but what if the distributions in re-
demption are somewhat disproportionate? How disproportionate
must they be to qualify as a purchase? If shareholders are related, how
are the stock holdings of such related parties to be taken into account
in determining the proportionality of a redemption? As to this latter
question, the Code provides explicit rules for attributing the stock
owned by one person to another. 4 Attribution rules are utilized in
connection with a number of Code provisions including the redemp-
assets and sales qualified as a § 346 partial liquidation); Rev. Rul. 71-250, 1971-1
C.B. 112 (sale by a corporation of one of its three television stations qualified as a §
346 partial liquidation). A partial liquidation also occurs when a distribution is one
of a series of distributions in complete liquidation of the corporation. I.R.C. §
346(a)(1). When distributions in partial liquidation are made pro rata among the
corporation's shareholders, it is not necessary that the distributions be made in
redemption of stock; an unadorned pro rata distribution will be sufficient in such
cases. Rev. Rul. 81-3, 1981-1 I.R.B. 11. To the extent that a distribution in redemp-
tion of stock or a pro rata non-redemption distribution qualifies as a partial liquida-
tion, it is treated as payment received for the sale of the distributee's stock. 1.R.C. §
331. For a more extensive discussion of partial liquidations, see B. Bittker & J.
Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders J 9.50-9.61
(4th ed. 1979); Cook & Marans, Partial Liquidation, 37-4 Tax Mngmt. (BNA) Al,
A7-14 (July 27, 1981); McGaffey & Garmer, Factors That Will Today Prove a
Distribution Was Made in Partial Liquidation, 31 J. Tax'n 204 (1969).
11. I.R.C. § 303. For a discussion of § 303, see B. Bittker & J. Eustice, supra note
10, 9.40; D. Kahn, supra note 2, § 2.25. Note that the Economic Recovery Tax Act
of 1981 amended § 303 so as to change the requisites for qualifying for the special
treatment accorded by that provision. In general, the 1981 Act expands the availabil-
ity of § 303.
12. I.R.C. § 302(d).
13. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(c) (1955). Thus, in the example in note 9, supra, the
tax consequence of the redemption was $6,000 dividend income to A, $4,000 to B,
and $2,000 to C. The $1,200 basis that A had in the six redeemed shares of X is
allocated equally among the 54 shares of X that he retained so that the basis of each
retained share is increased by $22.22. The basis of the shares redeemed from B and C
similarly are allocated among their retained shares. If the distributee of payments in
redemption does not retain any shares of the corporation's stock but is subjected to
dividend treatment on the redemption because of the attribution to him of shares
owned by another person, the basis of the redeemed shares may be allocated to the
shares held by such other person. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(c), e.x.(2) (1955).
14. I.R.C. § 318.
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tion provisions, but the rules are not the same for all purposes.'- There
is no statutory attribution of stock unless expressly provided for in the
Code. In determining the tax consequence of a redemption, the attri-
bution rules set forth in section 318 are adopted.10 A brief outline of
section 318 is set forth in Part I of this Article.
This Article discusses the requirements of section 302(b) for charac-
terizing a stock redemption as a purchase rather than as a dividend
equivalent.17 The focus is primarily on two issues: (1) whether the
election authorized by section 302(c)(2) to waive family attribution
rules should be available to an entity such as a trust or estate; and (2)
the determination of the standards to be applied in resolving whether
a redemption is "not essentially equivalent to a dividend" so that
section 302(b)(1) is applicable.
I. RULES OF CONSTRUCTIVE OWNERSHIP OF STOCK THAT
ABE APPLICABLE TO STOCK REDEMPTIONS
To determine the tax consequences of a stock redemption, it is first
necessary to ascertain the amount of stock constructively owned by a
shareholder under section 318, which provides for attribution in four
separate situations:
(1) Family attribution: an individual is deemed to own the stock
owned, directly or indirectly, by or for his spouse, children, grand-
children, and parents.1 8
(2) Attribution from certain entities to their beneficiaries or
owners:
(a) Stock owned, directly or indirectly, by or for a partnership or
estate is considered to be owned proportionately by its partners or
beneficiaries;'" for this purpose, a person whose only interest in
an estate is a future interest is not treated as a beneficiary of the
estate.
2 0
(b) Stock owned, directly or indirectly, by or for a trust is consid-
ered to be owned by the beneficiaries thereof in proportion to
their actuarially determined interest.2 ' For this purpose, unlike
15. Compare I.R.C. § 318 (stock attribution rules applicable to §§ 302, 304,
306(b)(1)(A), 334(b)(3)(C), 382(a)(3), 856(d), 958(b), 6038(d)(1)) with id. § 544
(stock attribution rules applicable to §§ 542(a)(2), 543(a)(7), 543(a)(6), 543(a)(4)).
16. Id. § 302(c)(1).
17. In addition to § 302(b), there are several other statutory provisions that can
characterize a stock redemption as a purchase in certain circumstances, see supra
notes 8-11 and accompanying text, but this Article deals only with redemptions
covered by § 302(b).
18. I.R.C. § 318(a)(1).
19. Id. § 318(a)(2)(A).
20. Treas. Reg. § 1.318-3(a), exs. (1), (2), T.D. 6969, 1968-2 C.B. 126, 131.
21. I.R.C. § 318(a)(2)(B)(i). If all or part of the trust income is taxed to the
grantor of the trust under §§ 671-677, however, then all or part of the trust's stocks
are deemed to be owned by the grantor. Id. § 318(a)(2)(B)(ii).
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the attribution from an estate, a person having a future interest in
a trust is a beneficiary thereof. 2
(c) A portion of stock owned, directly or indirectly, by or for a
corporation will be deemed owned by a shareholder having more
than a fifty percent interest in the corporation in proportion to
the shareholder's percentage interest in the corporation as deter-
mined by his share of the value of the corporation's outstanding
stock.23
(3) Attribution to certain entities from their beneficiaries or
owners:
(a) Stock owned, directly or indirectly, by or for a partner or
beneficiary of an estate is deemed to be owned by the partnership
or estate.2
4
(b) Stock owned, directly or indirectly, by or for the beneficiary
of a trust, other than certain employees' trusts, is deemed owned
by the trust. However, stock owned by a contingent beneficiary is
ignored, if the value of the contingent interest in the trust is
actuarially determined2- to be five percent or less of the value of
the trust's assets.26
(c) Stock owned, directly or indirectly, by or for a shareholder
having at least fifty percent in value of the stock of another
corporation is considered to be owned by the latter corporation.2 7
(4) The holder of an option to acquire stock is deemed the owner of
the stock that is subject to the option.28
22. See Treas. Reg. § 1.318-2(c), exs. (2), (3), T.D. 6969, 1968-2 C.B. 126, 131.
23. I.R.C. § 318(a)(2)(C).
24. Id. § 318(a)(3)(A). As noted above, a person having only a future interest in
an estate is not a beneficiary thereof. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. A
person who was a beneficiary of an estate will cease to be such when he has received
all of the property to which he is entitled, provided that he has no claim against the
estate and there is no more than a remote possibility that it will be necessary for the
estate to seek the return of the property or to seek payment from him by contribution
or otherwise to satisfy claims against the estate, including claims for death taxes, or
expenses of administration. Treas. Reg. § 1.318-3(a), T.D. 6969, 1968-2 C.B. 126,
131. While considerable caution must be taken, it is possible in some circumstances
for an estate to terminate the unwanted attribution of stock to it from a beneficiary,
especially the beneficiary of a pecuniary or specific bequest, by distributing the
beneficiary's property to him. See Estate of Weiskopf v. Commissioner, 77 Tax Ct.
Rep. (CCH) 3550 (July 29, 1981).
25. It appears that, for years beginning after 1970, the actuarial value of a
contingent beneficiary's interest in a trust will be determined according to the
methods established (including the table of factors) by Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-10
(1979) for ascertaining estate tax values. See Treas. Reg. § 1.318-3(b), T.D. 6969,
1968-2 C.B. 126, 131 (refers to the pre-1971 estate tax regulations for ascertaining
actuarial values).
26. I.R.C. § 318(a)(3)(B).
27. Id. § 318(a)(3)(C).
28. Id. § 318(a)(4).
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When stock is attributed to a person by section 318, he is treated as
if he were the actual owner of the attributed stock.2 9 The stock so
attributed may therefore be reattributed to another person. There are
two circumstances, however, in which constructively owned stock
under section 318 will not be reattributed to another person:
(1) Stock which is constructively owned by an individual under
family attribution rules-that is, attribution under section
318(a) (1)-is not reattributed to a member of the individual's family,
but such stock may be reattributed to an entity of which the individ-
ual is an owner or beneficiary. 30
(2) Stock which is attributed to an entity from a beneficiary or
owner thereof is not reattributed from the entity to a different benefi-
ciary or owner of that entity. 3' This provision prevents "sideways
attribution"-that is, attribution of stock from one beneficiary or
owner of an entity to another beneficiary or owner as a consequence
of attribution to and from an entity.32
The section 318 attribution rules were intended to prevent tax
avoidance by an illusory fragmentation of control. By the same token,
they were intended to have predictable application to the stock re-
demption rules of section 302.
II. STOCK REDEMPTIONS THAT QUALIFY AS PURCHASES
Section 302(d) provides that, except as otherwise provided in sub-
chapter C, the amounts received by a shareholder in redemption of his
29. I.R.C. § 318(a)(5)(A). For example, assume A is a beneficiary of the PT trust,
and the PT trust owns 100 shares of stock of X Corporation. The value of A's
actuarially determined interest in the PT trust is 75% of the value of the trust's assets.
A's wife, W, is a beneficiary of a pecuniary bequest from her father, F, whose estate
is currently under administration. W has not yet received her pecuniary bequest. W's
mother, M, is living and is the primary beneficiary of F's estate. A is treated as the
actual owner of 75 of the 100 shares of X stock owned by the PT trust. W is also
treated as the actual owner of the 75 shares of X stock that are attributed to her
husband, A. The estate of F is deemed to own the 75 shares of X stock that are
attributed to W from A and which were attributed to A from the PT trust. For
reasons explained below, see infra note 30 and accompanying text, none of the 75
shares of X are attributed to W's mother, M.
30. I.R.C. § 318(a)(5)(B). In the example in note 29, supra, the 75 shares of X
stock that were attributed to W from her husband under family attribution rules
could not be reattributed to W's mother because that would be applying family
attribution a second time in the same attribution set. As noted in that example,
however, the 75 shares of X are reattributed to the estate of which W is a beneficiary.
31. See I.R.C. § 318(a)(5)(C).
32. For instance, in the example in note 29, supra, the 75 shares of X stock that
were attributed from W to F's estate cannot be reattributed from the estate to M, the
primary beneficiary of the estate. See I.R.C. § 318(a)(5)(C). Prior to the 1964
amendment that adopted this restriction, sideways attribution of an individual's
stock could occur. S. Rep. No. 1240, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-8, reprinted in 1964 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 3396, 3401-03.
[Vol. 50
SECTION 302(b) REDEMPTIONS
stock are treated as a section 301 distribution from the corporation.
Two important exceptions to that treatment, sections 302(b)(2) and
302(b)(3), are statutory safe harbors which offer a taxpayer a reliable
route to purchase treatment. Under section 302(b)(2), the test for
purchase treatment is whether a shareholder's percentage ownership
has been substantially reduced. Section 302(b)(3) covers the complete
termination of a shareholder's interest. If these provisions are not
available to a taxpayer, section 302(b) (1) may provide protection from
dividend treatment.
A. Substantially Disproportionate Redemptions
Under section 302(b)(2), if the redemption of a shareholder's stock
complies with certain precise tests demonstrating that the redemption
is substantially disproportionate, the redemption will be treated as a
purchase. In applying these tests, the attribution rules of section 318
are employed in determining stock ownership. 33  To qualify, the
redemption must satisfy the following standards:
(1) Immediately after the redemption, the shareholder must own
less than fifty percent of the voting power of all classes of stock
entitled to vote.34
(2) The percentage of outstanding voting stock of the corporation
owned by the shareholder immediately after the redemption must be
less than eighty percent of the percentage of outstanding voting stock
of the corporation owned by the shareholder immediately prior to the
redemption. 35
(3) The shareholder's percentage of outstanding common stock of
the corporation, whether voting or nonvoting, before and after the
redemption must also meet the eighty percent requirement set forth in
the preceding paragraph. If there is more than one class of common
stock, the eighty percent requirement is measured according to the
fair market value of the common stock.3 6
Section 302(b)(2) applies to redemptions of voting stock or to re-
demptions of both voting and nonvoting stock.37 It does not apply to
33. I.R.C. § 302(c)(1).
34. Id. § 302(b)(2)(B).
35. Id. § 302(b)(2)(C).
36. Id.
37. Id. If the shareholder has no actual or constructive ownership of common
stock but does own voting preferred stock, the Commissioner ruled in Revenue
Ruling 81-41, 1981-6 I.R.B. 5, that a redemption of the shareholder's voting pre-
ferred stock can qualify for the § 302(b)(2) safe harbor even though no common stock
is redeemed. Revenue Ruling 81-41 constitutes an extremely liberal construction of§ 302(b)(2). The Commissioner relied on the fact that the legislative purpose for
requiring a redemption of common stock was to insure that a shareholder would not
utilize that safe harbor provision unless his percentage of participating interest in the
corporation was substantially reduced. Id. at 6. If the shareholder has no actual or
19811
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redemptions of solely nonvoting stock, whether common or pre-
ferred.3 8 It also does not apply to any redemption that will not be
substantially disproportionate with respect to the shareholder's stock
because of a plan contemplating subsequent redemptions of other
shareholder's stock.3 9
B. Termination of Shareholders Interest
Section 302(b)(3) provides that a redemption of a shareholder's
stock will constitute a purchase if, after applying the attribution rules
of section 318, the redemption terminates the shareholder's stock in-
terest in the corporation. A complete termination of a shareholder's
interest need not be effected in a single transaction, however. The
termination can be accomplished through a series of redemptions
provided that they are made pursuant to a firm and fixed plan. The
Tax Court has held that if the plan is definite, it need not be written,
absolutely binding, or communicated to others. 40
The Code mitigates the stringent operation of the attribution rules
by providing in section 302(c)(2) that the family attribution rules of
section 318(a)(1) do not apply to redemptions terminating a share-
holder's interest in a corporation if certain requisites are satisfied.
These requirements are:
(1) Immediately after the redemption, the distributee has no inter-
est in the corporation, including an interest as an officer, director or
employee, other than an interest as a creditor.4 1
(2) The distributee does not acquire any such interest, other than
stock acquired by bequest or inheritance, within ten years after the
redemption. 42
(3) The distributee files an agreement attached to his tax return for
the year in which the redemption occurred, in which he promises to
notify the district director of any interest he may acquire in the
corporation within the ten-year period. Such notification shall be
made within thirty days after the interest is acquired.43
If a distributee who executes an agreement under section 302(c)(2)
acquires a forbidden interest in the corporation within the ten-year
constructive ownership of common stock, the Commissioner concluded that the
situation at which the common stock redemption requirement is aimed does not exist
and there is no need to impose that requirement. Id. The Commissioner referred to
language in the Senate Finance Committee's report to support his view. Id. at 5-6.
Note that the ruling is limited to situations where the shareholder has no actual or
constructive ownership of the common stock. Id. at 6.
38. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-3(a)(3) (1955).
39. I.R.C. § 302(b)(2)(D).
40. Bleily & Collishaw, Inc. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 751, 756 (1979).
41. I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(A)(i).
42. Id. § 302(c)(2)(A)(ii).




period in contravention of the statutory requirement, the provisions of
section 302(c)(2) will not apply, 44 and a tax deficiency may be assessed
for the year in which the redemption occurred.
If an individual distributee executes a consulting agreement with
the distributing corporation under which the distributee agrees to
perform services as a consultant upon request during a stated period of
years in exchange for which the corporation agrees to pay a stated
dollar amount annually to the distributee, the Commissioner contends
that the distributee thereby acquires an interest in the corporation in
contravention of the terms of section 302(c)(2) .4  Indeed, the Com-
missioner asserts that if a distributee performs services for the distrib-
uting corporation within the ten-year period, "with or without com-
pensation," it will render section 302(c)(2) inapplicable. 4 The
validity of those rulings is clouded by the Tax Court's decision in
Lennard v. Commissioner.47
In Lennard, the Tax Court held that a distributee did not acquire a
forbidden interest in a distributing corporation merely because he
performed accounting services for the corporation in his capacity as
the managing partner of the accounting firm employed by the corpo-
ration. The court characterized the distributee as an independent
contractor and stated that "Congress did not intend to include inde-
pendent contractors possessing no financial stake in the corporation
among those who are considered as retaining an interest in the corpo-
ration for purposes of the attribution waiver rules."48 The court
determined that the "interest" in a corporation which Congress pro-
hibited was one which provided the distributee either with a financial
stake in the corporation or with control over its operations.49 An
employment contract can provide a distributee with such an interest,
but the employment of the distributee as an accountant did not pro-
vide him with control or with a sufficient financial stake to constitute
a prohibited interest, especially since the contract was not made for a
term of years but was terminable at any time. The Commissioner's
nonacquiescence in Lennard indicates that the government disagrees
with the decision and may well continue to litigate.
In addition to the above stated requirements, a waiver of the attri-
bution rules is not applicable if all or a portion of the redeemed stock
was acquired by the distributee during the previous ten years from a
person whose stock ownership would be attributed to the distributee
44. I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(B).
45. Rev. Rul. 70-104, 1970-1 C.B. 66.
46. Rev. Rul. 56-556, 1956-2 C.B. 177, 179.
47. 61 T.C. 554 (1974), nonacq. 1978-2 C.B. 3.
48. Id. at 561.
49. Id. at 561; see Chertkof v. Commissioner 72 T.C. 1113, 1126 (1979); Lewis
v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 129, 137-38 (1966) (Simpson, J., concurring).
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under section 318(a); or if a third person owns stock of the corporation
the ownership of which is attributable to the distributee under section
318(a) and such stock was acquired from the distributee within the
previous ten-year period unless the acquired stock is redeemed in the
same transaction.5 9 Neither of these two restrictions applies if the
acquisition or disposition referred to therein did not have federal
income tax avoidance as one of its principal purposes.," The Service
has announced that it will not rule on the question of whether an
acquisition or disposition of stock was motivated by tax avoidance
unless the facts and circumstances involved are "materially identical"
to those set forth in five specified rulings.52
By its terms, the waiver of or bar to attribution provided by section
302(c)(2) applies only to the family attribution imposed by section
318(a)(1). 5 3 The question arises as to whether section 302(c)(2) has
any efficacy in the circumstance where the distributee of a stock
redemption is an estate or trust so that the stock attributed to the
distributee does not come from a member of the distributee's family
but rather comes from a beneficiary to a trust or estate. Attribution
from a beneficiary to a trust or estate is provided by section 318(a) (3)
to which the literal terms of section 302(c)(2) do not apply. The
question becomes more complex if the beneficiary of the trust or estate
who causes the attribution problem does not own the attributed stock
outright but rather has constructive ownership as a result of attribu-
tion from a member of the beneficiary's family. The issues then be-
come whether section 302(c)(2) will prevent attribution from the
beneficiary's relative to the beneficiary so that there will then be no
reattribution to the trust or estate, and if so, who is the proper party
to file the agreement required by section 302(c)(2)(A)(iii).54
50. I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(B)(i), (ii).
51. Id. § 302(c)(2)(3). For an illustration of a non-tax avoidance purpose for a
gift of stock, see Rev. Rul. 77-293, 1977-2 C.B. 91.
52. Rev. Proc. 81-10, § 3.01(14), 1981-13 I.R.B. 44. The five specified rulings are
Rev. Rul. 79-67, 1979-1 C.B. 128; Rev. Rul. 77-293, 1977-2 C.B. 91; Rev. Rul.
57-387, 1957-2 C.B. 225; Rev. Rul. 56-584, 1956-2 C.B. 179; Rev. Rul. 56-556,
1956-2 C.B. 177.
53. The application of the waiver of attribution rules is illustrated by the follow-
ing example: Assume that at the time of his death A owned all 200 shares of
outstanding stock of X corporation and that those shares did not qualify for § 303
treatment on a redemption. A bequeathed 100 shares of X to his wife, W, and 100
shares of X to their son, S. Subsequently, A's estate was closed, and the shares were
distributed to W and S. X then redeemed all 100 of S's shares and S executed an
agreement pursuant to § 302(c)(2). The attribution rules of § 318 do not apply, and
the redemption of S's stock is deemed a purchase under § 302(b)(3).
54. Consider the example given in note 53, supra, except that the 100 shares
bequeathed to S were instead bequeathed to the Friendly National Bank in trust for
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The Commissioner first took the position that a fiduciary of a trust
or estate cannot utilize section 302(c)(2) in Revenue Ruling 5 9-233.ss
In Crawford v. Commissioner,5 6 however, the Tax Court allowed the
executrix of an estate to use section 302(c) (2) and thereby avoid family
attribution from the decedent's two children to the executrix, their
mother, from whom the stock would be reattributed to the estate
under section 318(a)(3)(A) because the mother was the sole benefi-
ciary of the decedent's estate. The court referred to Revenue Ruling
59-233 with apparent disapproval. In Crawford, the mother had also
executed a section 302(c)(2) agreement in her individual capacity
because the corporation had redeemed stock owned by her individu-
ally at the same time that it redeemed the estate's stock. The Tax
Court held that the agreement executed by the executrix was sufficient
and expressly declined to pass upon whether the agreement executed
by the mother individually should be given any effect.Y The Com-
missioner nonacquiesced in Crawford.-5  He reasserted his rejection
of that decision in Revenue Ruling 79-67.- 9
S. After A's estate was closed and the stock was distributed to IV and to the trustee,
the X Corporation redeemed from the trust the 100 shares of stock held in trust for S.
The trustee, seeking to comply with § 302(c)(2) in order to avoid attribution rules,
executed and filed the agreement required by § 302(c)(2)(A)(iii). The Commissioner
has ruled that § 302(c)(2) does not prevent attribution in this case and that the trust is
deemed to own the 100 shares of X stock held by W. Rev. Rul. 59-233, 1959-2 C.B.
106, 107; Rev. Rul. 79-67, 1979-1 C.B. 128, 129. The Commissioner's position is that
§ 302(c)(2) renders inapplicable family attribution rules pertaining to the party
whose stock is redeemed, but it does not preclude the operation of other attribution
rules. See Rev. Rul. 59-233, 1959-2 C.B. 106, 107. Here, S is considered as owning
W's 100 shares because of family attribution, but the stock is reattributed to the trust
under § 318(a)(3) which is not a family attribution provision and, under the Commis-
sioner's position, is not vitiated by § 302(c)(2). The Commissioner further contends
that an agreement executed by the trustee cannot prevent the attribution from IV to S
because S is not the distributee (the trust is the distributee) and because the agree-
ment precludes family attribution only to the distributee who executes it. See Rodgers
P. Johnson Trust v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 941, 950 (1979) (statement of the
Commissioner's position). Even if S also were to execute an agreement, the Commis-
sioner maintains that it would have no effect on the attribution from W to S because
S is not the distributee of the redemption payment. See Rev. Rul. 59-233, 1959-2
C.B. 106. As noted below, the Tax Court has repudiated the Commissioner's position
on this issue, Rodgers P. Johnson Trust v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 941, 955 (1979);
Crawford v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 830, 836-37 (1973), nonacq. 1974-2 C.B. 5, and
the Fifth Circuit has repudiated the Commissioner's position that § 302(c)(2) bars
only family attribution. Rickey v. United States, 592 F.2d 1251, 1258 (5th Cir.
1979).
55. 1959-2 C.B. 106, 107.
56. 59 T.C. 830 (1973), nonacq. 1974-2 C.B. 5.
57. Id. at 836-37.
58. 1974-2 C.B. 5.
59. 1979-1 C.B. 128, 129.
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In Rickey v. United States,60 the Fifth Circuit, in allowing an estate
to use section 302(c)(2), went much further than the Tax Court's
position in Crawford. In Rickey, the executrix of the estate executed
the agreement required by section 302(c)(2) in order to prevent the
attribution to the decedent's estate of stock owned by her step-son.
The step-son was one of the residuary legatees of the estate, and his
shares of stock were attributable to the estate under section 318(a)(3).
Family attribution was not involved. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit
held that the section 302(c)(2) agreement barred attribution to the
estate from the beneficiary. The court rejected what it termed a
"labored application of the literal language of the statute."'
'1
The Fifth Circuit's position is an unwarranted extension of explicit
statutory language. There is nothing in the statute or in the legislative
history to suggest that the restriction of the waiver to family attribu-
tion was anything other than deliberate. The Tax Court has twice
rejected the position adopted by the Fifth Circuit-once in the pre-
Rickey decision of Rodgers P. Johnson Trust v. Commissioner12 and
again in the post-Rickey decision of David Metzger Trust v. Commis-
sioner. 3 Metzger Trust was reviewed by the entire Tax Court, and
the decision on this issue was unanimous. Indeed, in the Metzger
Trust case, the Tax Court rejected the Rickey position even though on
appeal the case would go to the Fifth Circuit. Ordinarily, under its
Golsen rule, the Tax Court, in resolving an issue, will adhere to the
view adopted by the circuit court to which review of the matter will
lie. 4 The Tax Court, however, decided that Metzger Trust was
distinguishable from Rickey because the corporation and the estate in
Rickey may have been required by the articles of incorporation and
the decedent's directions in his will to cause the redemption of the
decedent's stock.6 5  No such requirement was present in Metzger
Trust. The Tax Court did not deem the presence of a mandatory
redemption agreement to be a sufficient reason to justify the applica-
tion of section 302(c)(2), but it determined that since the Fifth Circuit
gave so much attention to that fact, the circuit court may have
thought it significant. The Tax Court decided that because the case
before it was distinguishable from Rickey on a basis that the Fifth
Circuit might consider to be important, the court was not bound by
60. 592 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1979).
61. Id. at 1258.
62. 71 T.C. 941, 952 (1979).
63. 76 T.C. 42, 68-72 (1981).
64. The "Golsen rule" is named after the 1970 decision of the Tax Court that
adopted it, Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970), ajJ'd, 445 F.2d 985
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971).
65. 76 T.C. at 73-74.
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its Golsen rule.61 If appealed, it will be interesting to see if the Fifth
Circuit adheres to the view it adopted in Rickey.
Subsequent to the Crawford decision, the Tax Court raised the
question of whether the Crawford holding applied only to estates and
not to trusts.67 The Tax Court resolved that question in Rodgers P.
Johnson Trust v. Commissioner,68 where the court held that an agree-
ment, filed under section 302(c)(2) by the trustees of a testamentary
trust, was effective to prevent attribution of stock owned by the
mother of the beneficiary of the trust to the beneficiary. Accord-
ingly, stock redeemed from the trust was treated as a purchase under
section 302(b)(3). While the beneficiary, the son, also filed an agree-
ment in his individual capacity, he was not a distributee of the re-
demption payment and the court did not pass on the question of
whether his agreement had any effect. The agreement filed by the
trustees was deemed to be sufficient. 0
The positions adopted by the Tax Court in Crawford and Johnson
Trust raise difficult interpretative questions and problems of adminis-
tration. The condition section 302(c)(2) exacts for its operation is that
the distributee must not acquire an interest in the corporation for a
period of ten years following the redemption. Furthermore, if the
distributee does acquire such an interest within this period, he must
promptly inform the Service. 71 If a fiduciary can preclude family
attribution to a beneficiary of the estate or trust by agreeing that the
estate or trust will not acquire an interest in the corporation within
the ten-year period, is the beneficiary free to acquire such an interest
during this period without affecting the treatment of the redemption?
If so, the expansion of section 302(c)(2) for use in such redemptions is
questionable. The Tax Court suggested in dictum in Johnson Trust
that an acquisition of stock by a beneficiary within the proscribed
period would cause the stock to be attributed to the trust or estate
under section 318(a)(3) and thereby provide the trust or estate with a
prohibited interest in the corporation so that the benefits of section
302(c)(2) would be lost.72 The Tax Court apparently construes the
statutory mandate that a distributee not "acquire" a prohibited inter-
est to include the distributee's constructive acquisition of stock ac-
quired by another and attributed to the distributee under section 318.
The court's dictum on this issue, however, appears to apply only to a
66. Id. at 72-74.
67. Robin Haft Trust v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 145, 148 (1974) (supplemental
opinion), vacated, 510 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1975).
68. 71 T.C. 941 (1979).
69. Id. at 955.
70. Id.
71. I.R.C. § 302(c)(2).
72. 71 T.C. at 952.
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beneficiary's stock acquisitions. If the beneficiary acquires a prohib-
ited interest in the corporation in some form other than stock, for
example by becoming an officer of the corporation, there is no statu-
tory provision to attribute that type of interest to the trust or estate.
Section 318 applies attribution rules only to stock interests, 73 and
section 302(c)(1) deals only with the constructive ownership of stock.74
Assuming the validity of the court's dictum that acquisition of a
prohibited stock interest by a beneficiary during the existence of the
trust or estate constitutes an acquisition by the trust or estate itself,
what if the prohibited interest is acquired after the termination of the
entity? In dictum in Johnson Trust, the Tax Court suggests that the
acquisition of a prohibited interest in the corporation by the transferee
of the assets of the terminated estate or trust may void the section
302(c)(2) election.75 If, as is by no means certain, the Tax Court will
treat the transferee of an estate or trust as the successor to the trust or
estate for purposes of applying the ten-year restraint on stock owner-
ship, will that rule apply to all beneficiaries of the entity, including
those who had no actual or constructive ownership of the corpora-
tion's stock at the time of the redemption, and will it apply to the
transferee's acquisition of a non-stock interest in the corporation?
Consider the following example.
D died survived by his wife, W, and by a son, S, from his first
marriage to M. D and M both owned stock of the X corporation. D's
will left a pecuniary bequest of $30,000 to S and the residue of his
estate to W. The X stock owned by the estate was redeemed, and the
executor filed the agreement required by section 302(c) (2). The estate
was promptly terminated, and distributions to the beneficiaries were
completed. Four years later, M gives several shares of X stock to S.
Does the acquisition of X stock by S, who is a tranferee of some of the
assets of D's estate, cause the estate to lose its protection under section
302(c)(2)?
If the Tax Court is correct that an acquisition of an interest in the
distributing corporation by a beneficiary of a trust or estate will
constitute an acquisition by the trust or estate itself, there will be
serious administrative problems. To qualify for section 302(c)(2) re-
lief, the fiduciary of an estate or trust must execute an agreement to
notify the Service promptly if the estate or trust acquires an interest in
the corporation within the ten-year period. But, if the interest is
acquired by a beneficiary of the estate or trust while it is still in
existence, so that the interest is attributed to the estate or trust by
73. I.R.C. § 318.
74. Id. § 302(c)(1).
75. Rodgers P. Johnson Trust v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 941, 954 (1979).
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section 318(a)(3), the fiduciary may not be aware of it. Indeed, the
beneficiary may have acquired only a constructive interest in the
corporation by virtue of his interest in a partnership, corporation, or
another trust which has acquired an actual interest in the corporation.
In such cases, it will be especially unlikely that the fiduciary of the
distributee estate or trust will have knowledge of the beneficiary's
constructive ownership. Presumably, the fiduciary will not be liable
for failing to report the acquisition of an interest of which he has no
knowledge. If notice is not given, however, the statute of limitations
for assessment and collection of the tax on the redemption will never
run. Moreover, the Service is not likely to discover the beneficiary's
actual or constructive ownership of an interest in the corporation, and
it is not likely to be reported because of the fiduciary's ignorance of
the facts and the beneficiary's ignorance of the significance of the
acquisition.
In the example above, if M did not give any of her stock to S and if
four years after the redemption took place S was employed by X in a
managerial capacity, will that employment rescind the operation of
the section 302(c)(2) election and cause the redemption to be treated
as a dividend equivalent?
The administrative difficulties attendant to construing section
302(c)(2) as permitting elections to be made by fiduciaries strongly
suggests that Congress never intended that result. It seems likely that,
as the Commissioner contends, the provision was intended to bar
family attribution to the distributee himself, but not to bar family
attribution to other persons. 76 To date, however, the courts have
uniformly rejected the Commissioner's view.77
C. Not Essentially Equivalent to a Dividend
If dividend treatment were to be determined solely on the basis of
the mechanical application of the precise criteria contained in sections
302(b)(2) and (3) it could produce unduly harsh results. Accordingly,
Congress provided relief by enacting the flexible language of section
302(b)(1). 7 This section is an adoption of the pre-1954 Code test;7"
76. Rev. Rul. 79-67, 1979-1 C.B. 128; Rev. Rul. 59-233, 1952-9 C.B. 106-107;
see Rodgers P. Johnson Trust v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 941, 950 (1979) (statement of
the Commissioner's position).
77. Rickey v. United States, 592 F.2d 1251, 1258 (5th Cir. 1979); Rodgers P.
Johnson Trust v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 941, 955 (1979); Crawford v. Commis-
sioner, 59 T.C. 830, 836, nonacq. 1974-2 C.B. 5.
78. S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 44-45 [hereinafter cited as 1954 Senate
Report], reprinted in 1954 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4621, 4675.
79. Internal Revenue Code of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-1, § 115(g), 53 Stat. 1, 48.
"If a corporation cancels or redeems its stock.., at such time and in such manner as
to make the distribution and cancellation or redemption in whole or in part essen-
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namely, redemptions "not essentially equivalent to a dividend" are
treated as purchases.8 0 Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Davis,"' the courts split over the interpretation of that
phrase. One line of cases adopted a "strict net effect" test-that is,
whether the shareholders' positions resulting from the redemption are
substantially different from the positions they would have been in had
a dividend been distributed. 82  A second line of cases followed a
"business purpose" or "flexible net effect" test: whether the redemp-
tion was designed to serve a legitimate business purpose.8 3 In Davis,
the Supreme Court repudiated the business purpose test and adopted a
strict net effect test.14 Under this test, if a redemption is pro rata or
nearly pro rata, it will not qualify as a purchase. The Supreme Court
also held in Davis that the section 318 attribution rules are to be
applied in determining whether a redemption qualifies under section
302(b)(1) as not essentially equivalent to a dividend. 85
The extent to which a redemption must be disproportionate to
qualify as not essentially equivalent to a dividend is far from certain.
In Davis, the Supreme Court said that to qualify "a redemption must
result in a meaningful reduction of the shareholder's proportionate
interest in the corporation." 8 Although the determination of what
constitutes a "meaningful reduction" has been characterized as a ques-
tion of fact,8 7 the resolution of that issue often rests on legal standards.
While the precise contours of the line dividing meaningful from non-
meaningful reductions is not settled, there are a number of rulings and
decisions that shed some light on the problem .8 The courts80 and the
Commissioner"0 have been fairly liberal in applying this provision,
tially equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend, the amount so distributed
.. . shall be treated as a taxable dividend." Id.
80. I.R.C. § 302(b)(1).
81. 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
82. See Levin v. Commissioner, 385 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1967); Wiseman v. United
States, 371 F.2d 816 (1st Cir. 1967); Hasbrook v. United States, 343 F.2d 811 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 834 (1965).
83. See Commissioner v. Berenbaum, 369 F.2d 337 (10th Cir. 1966); Ballenger v.
United States, 301 F.2d 192 (4th Cir. 1962); United States v. Fewell, 255 F.2d 496
(5th Cir. 1958).
84. 397 U.S. 301, 311-312 (1970).
85. Id. at 307.
86. Id. at 313.
87. David Metzger Trust v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 42, 61 (1981); Treas. Reg. §
1.302-2(b) (1955).
88. See Blumstein, When Is a Redemption "Not Essentially Equivalent to a
Dividend"?, 7 J. Corp. Tax'n 99 (1980).
89. See Postlewaite & Finneran, Section 302(b)(1): The Expanding Minnow, 64
Va. L. Rev. 561, 567, 574-81 (1978).
90. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 77-426, 1977-2 C.B. 87 (redemption of five percent of a
noncontrolling shareholder's preferred stock qualified for purchase treatment under §
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and at least one pair of commentators has criticized them for failing to
apply a more restrictive construction.91
A "meaningful reduction of a shareholder's proportionate interest
in the corporation" might be deemed to refer to: a significant reduc-
tion of the shareholder's voting interest, that is, a loss of some element
of control; a reduction in his dividend rights; a reduction in his
percentage interest in the proceeds of a complete liquidation of the
corporation; or a reduction in some combination of the above.92
1. Redemption of Voting Stock
a. Shareholder had voting control prior to the redemption
When voting stock of a majority shareholder is redeemed, the
courts and the Commissioner have looked primarily to the control of
the shareholder after the redemption to determine whether a mean-
ingful reduction has occurred. 93 The Commissioner's current view is
that a reduction of a majority voting interest to a voting interest of no
more than fifty percent will be sufficient for section 302(b)(1) but that
a reduction of voting interest to a percentage that is greater than fifty
percent will not qualify.9 4 It is possible that a reduction of voting
interest to fifty percent or less will not qualify as a purchase if the
shareholder retains effective control of the corporation, but the Com-
missioner has not yet sought to apply section 301 treatment in such
circumstances and no court has done so. The Tax Court has suggested,
however, that effective control is a factor to be weighed.95
A shareholder may be said to have effective control of a corporation
if the shareholder and one or more persons, who are related and
friendly to the shareholder but who are not of such relationship that
302(b)(1)); Rev. Rul. 76-385, 1976-2 C.B. 92 (redemption of parent corporation's
and its subsidiary corporation's stock in a publicly held corporation which resulted in
a reduction of the parent's actual interest and the subsidiary's constructive interest
from .0001118% of the stock outstanding to .0001081% qualified for purchase
treatment under § 302(b)(1)); Rev. Rul. 76-364, 1976-2 C.B. 91 (redemption effect-
ing a 4.73 percentage point reduction in a shareholder's ownership interest qualified
for purchase treatment under § 302(b)(1)); Rev. Rul. 75-512, 1975-2 C.B. 112
(redemption effecting a 5.7 percentage point reduction in a minority shareholder's
ownership interest qualified for purchase treatment under § 302(b)(1)); Rev. Rul.
75-502, 1975-2 C.B. 111 (redemption effecting a 7 percentage point reduction of a
shareholder's actual and constructive ownership interest qualified as a purchase
under § 302(b)(1)).
91. Postlewaite & Finneran, supra note 89, at 564.
92. See Himmel v. Commissioner, 338 F.2d 815, 817 (2d Cir. 1964).
93. See, e.g., Benjamin v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 1259, 1261 n.3 (5th Cir.
1979).
94. See Rev. Ru. 78-401, 1978-2 C.B. 127; Rev. Rul. 77-218, 1977-1 C.B. 81;
Rev. Rul. 75-502, 1975-2 C.B. 111.
95. David Metzger Trust v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 42, 63 (1981).
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their shares are attributed to the shareholder under section 318, can
exercise control of the corporation by joining together and voting their
stock in concert. The substantiality of a shareholder's effective control
depends upon the number of persons whose assent the shareholder
needs (the fewer needed, the more substantial is the effective control),
the total number of shareholders, and the likelihood that the person or
persons whose votes are needed will support the shareholder's corpo-
rate proposals.
When a redemption causes a majority shareholder to lose unilateral
control of a corporation, it should be treated as a meaningful reduc-
tion of his interest regardless of whether the shareholder has "effective
control" because of the possibility of obtaining the votes of a friendly
co-shareholder, even if the vote of only one such person is needed. The
shareholder's loss of unilateral control renders him vulnerable to a loss
of either the continuing friendship or the pliability of the other party.
The vulnerability that the shareholder suffers as a consequence of the
redemption cannot be equated with a dividend distribution in which
no stock was redeemed. Such a redemption, therefore, is not "essen-
tially equivalent to a dividend," and should be treated as a purchase
under section 302(b) (1).
Some commentators have suggested that the determination of a
shareholder's control should be made as of a date prior to the redemp-
tion because the legislative history indicates that a shareholder's inca-
pacity to prevent the occurrence of the redemption was the motivat-
ing force for adopting section 302(b)(1). 8 The scope of an act,
however, is not necessarily limited to the factual pattern that induced
Congress to adopt it. The shareholder's control after the redemption is
a better measure of the extent of his change of position in that his
power to compensate for the decline in his stock interest depends upon
post-redemption control.
The Eighth Circuit held in a two-to-one decision in Wright v.
United States97 that a reduction of a shareholder's voting interest from
85 % to 61.7 % was a meaningful reduction because under state law a
two-thirds vote was required to authorize a merger, consolidation or
liquidation, or to amend the articles of incorporation, and the share-
holder therefore lost the power to make those decisions unilaterally.98
In Revenue Ruling 78-401,99 the Commissioner rejected the holding in
Wright and stated that such a reduction was not meaningful when
there is no indication that any of the types of corporate action that
require a two-thirds vote are contemplated for the near future. The
negative inference from that qualification is that if an action requiring
96. Postlewaite & Finneran, supra note 89, at 593.
97. 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973).
98. Id. at 609.
99. 1978-2 C.B. 127.
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a two-thirds vote were a serious option at the time of the redemption,
the shareholder's loss of unilateral control over that action could
constitute a meaningful reduction; but not much reliance can be
placed on a negative inference. If, after such a redemption, the share-
holder had effective two-thirds control, the redemption might not
qualify as a purchase even if the Commissioner adopts the negative
inference of his 1978 ruling. However, as noted above, it appears that
the loss of unilateral control constitutes a meaningful reduction in the
shareholder's interest.100 The sole issue, then, in the above-described
circumstances, is whether the types of action that require a two-thirds
vote are of sufficient significance to characterize a reduction in the
shareholder's voting interest to a percentage that is less than two-
thirds as meaningful.
For administrative reasons, the question of the meaningfulness of a
shareholder's loss of control over corporate actions that require a
two-thirds vote should be determined as a general proposition rather
than on an ad hoc basis. There would be considerable difficulties
encountered in attempting to distinguish those cases where a genuine
prospect of liquidation or merger exists from those where an investiga-
tion of a possible merger or liquidation has been initiated by the
majority shareholder in order to qualify a redemption under section
302(b)(1). Although the application of section 302(b)(1) can rest on a
factual inquiry into the presence of special circumstances, such as the
nature of the relationship of the shareholders,10' the external evidence
of a friendly or hostile relationship cannot be manipulated as readily
as can evidence of a contemplation of some corporate action. The
shareholders' manifestation of a friendly or hostile relationship has
significance independent of the tax considerations. The mere contem-
plation of taking corporate action often will have no independent
non-tax consequence. Therefore, contrary to the negative inference in
Revenue Ruling 78-401, the imminence of a corporate action requir-
ing a two-thirds vote should be inapposite.
The power of a majority shareholder to cause the corporation to
compensate him for the loss of his redeemed shares is so pervasive that
the shareholder's loss of unilateral control over even such important
steps as the decision to liquidate or to merge pales in significance. The
shareholder's loss of control over such corporate decisions makes the
redemption less like a dividend than a redemption where no loss of
such control occurs-for example, where the shareholder never had
two-thirds voting control. Nevertheless, such a redemption is more
similar to a dividend than it is to a purchase. While it is a close
100. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
101. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(b) (1955); see Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600,
606 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Carey, 289 F.2d 531, 537 (8th Cir. 1961);
United States v. Fewel, 255 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1958); David Metzger Trust v.
Commissioner, 76 T.C. 42, 52 (1981).
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question, it seems that section 302(b)(1) should not apply to those
cases. 1
0 2
b. Redemption of stock of a minority shareholder
A minority shareholder whose percentage interest of common stock
is reduced by a redemption may not have lost a significant voting
interest, since he already lacked control, unless his prospects of shar-
ing control by joining with a small number of shareholders is dimin-
ished by the redemption.10 3 Because a shift in voting rights is of less
importance to a minority shareholder than to one who has voting
control, a reduction of dividend rights and liquidation interests be-
comes a more significant factor.
If the minority shareholder owns only a miniscule percentage of a
corporation, a non-pro rata redemption of any number of his shares of
common stock should qualify under section 302(b)(1). For example, in
Revenue Ruling 76-385,104 a reduction of a shareholder's percentage
interest from .0001118% to .0001081%, a reduction of only 3.3%,
was determined to qualify for section 302(b)(1) treatment. A non-pro
rata redemption of even one share from such a shareholder bears no
similarity to a dividend.
The Commissioner has also ruled that a reduction in common stock
from a 27% interest to a 22.27% interest, a reduction of only 4.73
percentage points, is meaningful, 10 5 because, prior to the redemption,
the distributee had the prospect of exercising control by joining with
only one other shareholder, and the redemption deprived him of that
power. On the other hand, in Rodgers P. Johnson Trust, the Tax
Court held a reduction of a trust's interest in a corporation, after
applying attribution rules, from 43.6% to 40.8% not to be meaning-
ful. 06 The Tax Court asserts that non-attribution family relation-
ships are to be taken into account in applying section 302(b)(1) unless
hostility among them indicates that they are not likely to act in
concert. 107
c. Non-statutory attribution of stock held by friendly relatives
A central inquiry with respect to a section 302(b)(1) redemption is
whether actual or effective control is retained. As to the latter, attri-
bution is not necessarily restricted to the express provisions of section
102. Contra Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973).
103. See Rev. Rul. 76-364, 1976-2 C.B. 91.
104. 1976-2 C.B. 92.
105. Rev. Rul. 76-364, 1976-2 C.B. 91.
106. 71 T.C. at 948. The Tax Court nevertheless treated the redemption as a
purchase because it held that a trust's waiver of family attribution under § 302(c)(2)
was valid. Id. at 955.
107. David Metzger Trust v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 42, 62-63 (1981).
[Vol. 50
SECTION 302(b) REDEMPTIONS
318. The congressional purpose for enacting section 318, however,
was to provide predictability and to eliminate the need for making ad
hoc judgments as to the extent of the autonomy of members of a
family or other related group.' °0 If the relationship of a taxpayer to
other shareholders is taken into account, the scope of stock attribution
will be expanded to reach circumstances where the facts suggest that
concerted action is likely. This approach opens the door to the very
kind of inquiry and uncertainty of application that section 318 was
intended to prevent. However, uncertainty will arise only in conjunc-
tion with the question of the availability of section 302(b)(1), a provi-
sion which was included in the 1954 Code to provide a less rigid, and
accordingly a less predictable, standard than the more precise stand-
ards adopted by sections 302(b)(2) and (3).109
The legislative history of the 1954 Act reveals that while the House
of Representatives first sought to eliminate a dividend equivalence test
from the section 302 rules because of its vagueness,"10 Congress ulti-
mately decided to retain that test."' Portions of the legislative his-
tory suggest that the reason for this change of position was concern for
the plight of a shareholder, the redemption of whose stock was de-
creed by others who are in control of the corporation. Specifically, the
Senate Finance Committee, explaining its decision to reject the
House's removal of the 1939 Code's dividend equivalence test, stated:
While the House bill set forth definite conditions under which stock
may be redeemed at capital-gain rates, these rules appeared unne-
cessarily restrictive, particularly, in the case of redemptions of
preferred stock which might be called by the corporation without
the shareholder having any control over when the redemption may
take place. Accordingly, your committee follows existing law by
reinserting the general language indicating that a redemption shall
be treated as a distribution in part or full payment in exchange for
the stock if the redemption is not essentially equivalent to a di'i-dend. 11
It does not follow that the only type of redemption that can be
covered by section 302(b)(1) is one similar to the example given in the
first sentence quoted above-namely, one involving exclusively non-
voting stock. Indeed, the cure adopted by the Senate was to reinstate
the 1939 Code standard." 3 Presumably, the solution was considera-
bly broader than needed to resolve the difficulty encountered in the
108. Coyle v. United States, 415 F.2d 488, 490 (4th Cir. 1968).
109. See infra notes 110-114 and accompanying text.
110. H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 35-36, reprinted in 1954 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 4025, 4060-61.
111. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
112. 1954 Senate Report, supra note 78, at 44-45, reprinted in 1954 U.S. Code




situation set forth in the quoted statement because that situation was
merely an example of the harsh consequences that would occur if the
only standards for purchase treatment were the rigid standards of
sections 302(b)(2) and (3). The breadth of coverage and flexibility of
treatment that Congress intended to apply to stock redemptions by
adopting section 302(b)(1) is shown by the statement in the Senate
Report that the standard to be employed in determining dividend
equivalence under the 1954 Code is, in general, the same as the one
that was employed in construing a similar provision in the 1939
Code.11 4 While it is unlikely that the Senate intended to adopt the
entirety of the broad construction that was applied to the 1939 Code,
the reference to existing law belies any suggestion that section
302(b)(1) is limited to redemptions of nonvoting stock held by share-
holders lacking control.
In sum, the effort to resolve the question of whether the operation
of section 302(b)(1) should rest on an examination of the friendly and
cooperative nature of the relationship among the shareholders dis-
closes the presence of a tension between two conflicting principles
both of which apply to the subject. On the one hand are the section
318 attribution rules which provide precise mechanical tests to pro-
mote certainty and predictability. On the other lie the deliberately
vague contours of section 302(b)(1) which was intended to provide
relief for the harsh consequences in this area of applying only precise
mechanical tests.
In the author's view, the tension between the underlying principles
of section 302(b)(1) and section 318 should generally be resolved in
favor of the former. It might be suggested that because the operation
of section 302(b) (1) itself is in issue, it is reasonable to grant priority to
the congressional scheme for adopting that provision over the ration-
ale underlying the adoption of a complementary provision. Unfortu-
nately, the simplicity of that argument is sullied by the facts that the
identification of the congressional scheme for adopting section
302(b) (1) is not free of doubt and that section 318 is so fundamental to
and integrated with section 302 that it is difficult to speak of separate
and distinct purposes for those two provisions. In response to the latter
point, however, it is significant that sections 302 and 318 were inte-
grated in the House's bill prior to the Senate's insertion of section
302(b)(1) and that Congress' purpose for adopting the rest of section
302 was exactly the same as its purpose in enacting section 318-to
provide precise mechanical tests. To the extent that the last minute
insertion of section 302(b)(1) conflicts with that original purpose, it
114. 1954 Senate Report, supra note 78, at 234, reprinted in 1954 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News at 4870.
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seems that Congress, believing that the section 302 safe harbor and
section 318 attribution tests are too restrictive to be exclusive, deliber-
ately chose a more flexible standard.
Even assuming that the purposes for adopting section 302(b)(1)
override the objective of sections 318, 302(b)(2) and (3) to provide
precision and predictability, the extent to which it is appropriate to
create non-statutory stock attribution rules has to be resolved. A
minority shareholder's "effective control" of a closely held corporation
by joining with a small number of other shareholders is dependent
upon their continuing cooperation. When a shareholder's stock inter-
est, including his constructive stock ownership, is sufficient to provide
him with voting control of the corporation, a redemption that de-
prives him of that position should be treated as a meaningful reduc-
tion even if after the redemption the shareholder need find only one
other shareholder to join with him in order to exercise control. As
previously stated, the vulnerability resulting from losing unilateral
control is a substantial change of circumstance that appears to the
author to be sufficient to distinguish such a redemption from a divi-
dend distribution.'15
Of course, the easier it is under the factual circumstances for a
shareholder to obtain the cooperation of one with sufficient shares to
provide him with control, the closer the redemption is to dividend
equivalence. For example, if the shareholder needs the consent of only
one other shareholder and if there are ten other shareholders available
to seek as a partner, the "effective control" of the shareholder is fairly
close to unilateral control. Conversely, if there is only one other
shareholder available, the vulnerability of the redeeming shareholder
is far greater. In any event, regardless of the number of other share-
holders that are available, the loss of unilateral control is sufficient to
constitute a meaningful reduction.
If, after taking into account shares held by friendly relatives, a
minority shareholder has effective control, a redemption of his shares
should not fall under 302(b)(1) unless the decline in his percentage
interest is such that for effective control he needs additional share-
holders to join with him. If the number of persons whose cooperation
he needs in order to have control is increased, there appears to have
115. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 75-502, 1975-2 C.B. Ill (Commissioner held that a
reduction of a shareholder's actual and constructive interest from 57 % to 50 % was a
meaningful reduction under § 302(b)(1)). The same vulnerability exists where a
shareholder's actual stock ownership is insufficient to provide him with control and
he has control only by virtue of adding the constructive ownership of shares attrib-
uted to him by § 318-i.e., his "control" depends upon the cooperation of the related
parties. But, in § 318, Congress made a legislative determination that the potential
abuse if such close relationships were not taken into account outweighs consider-
ations of the taxpayer's vulnerability to alienation.
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been a meaningful reduction." 6 This view of the transaction is essen-
tially a variation on the approach suggested above for the treatment of
a redemption where a shareholder loses unilateral control. Neither the
Service nor the courts have passed on this issue.
d. Hostility among shareholders
The other side of the question of whether attribution can be judi-
cially expanded to cover friendly relations not listed in section 318 is
the question whether hostility or "bad blood" among persons listed in
section 318 precludes the attribution of stock or otherwise influences a
determination of dividend equivalence. As to the attribution rules
themselves, stock will be attributed under section 318 regardless of the
hostility among the parties involved. 117 This construction conforms
with the legislative purpose for adopting section 318. The question
remains, however, as to what effect family hostility has on the opera-
tion of section 302(b)(1).
The "bad blood" or hostility in a family group can be regarded as a
factual circumstance to be considered in determining whether a re-
demption is meaningful. Under this approach, if the redemption of
stock of a shareholder would qualify as a meaningful redemption if it
were not for the attribution of stock to him from his relatives, the fact
that there is animosity between the family members is a factor to be
weighed in favor of qualifying the redemption under section
302(b)(1). This position was adopted by the First Circuit in Haft Trust
v. Commissioner,"18 and, in dictum, the Fifth Circuit asserted its
approval in Rickey v. United States."" It is noteworthy that Treasury
Regulation section 1.302-2(b) may support the Haft Trust decision.
The regulation states that the question of dividend equivalence for a
redemption "depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case"
and that merely "[o]ne of the facts to be considered in making this
determination is the constructive stock ownership of such shareholder
under section 318(a)." 120
The Tax Court's position on this issue is somewhat ambivalent. In
the Haft Trust case, after applying section 318 attribution, the tax-
payer's percentage interest in the corporation was not reduced at all
by the redemption; in fact, its percentage interest was increased. In
116. See Rev. Rul. 76-364, 1976-2 C.B. 91.
117. David Metzger Trust v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 42, 58-59 (1981); Nieder-
meyer v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 280, 285-86 (1974), aff'd, 535 F.2d 500 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976); cf. Miller v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 182 (1980)
(holding that family hostility does not affect the prohibition under I.R.C. § 267
against a deduction for a loss incurred on a sale between brothers).
118. 510 F.2d 43, 48 (1st Cir. 1975).
119. 592 F.2d 1251, 1257 n.6 (5th Cir. 1974).
120. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(b) (1955).
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that context, the Tax Court held that the question of family hostility
that was raised by the taxpayer was irrelevant in that stock attribution
and the application of section 302(b)(1) did not turn on the actual
relationship of the parties involved.' 21
As previously noted, in reviewing the Tax Court, the First Circuit
held family hostility to be a relevant factor.-22 A subsequent decision
of a majority of the Tax Court in Metzger Trust refined the court's
position. In Metzger Trust, the court held that family hostility is a
factor in applying section 302(b)(1) in either of two instances: (1)
where the taxpayer's actual and constructive stock ownership is insuf-
ficient to provide control, bad blood between related persons who are
not listed in the section 318 attribution categories can prevent the
taxpayer from being treated as having effective control as a conse-
quence of the stock owned by such hostile family members; (2) if,
after applying the constructive ownership rules of section 318, the
taxpayer's percentage interest is reduced to any extent at all, family
hostility is a proper factor in determining whether section 302(b)(1)
applies. 12 3 On the other hand, if, after applying constructive owner-
ship rules, the taxpayer's percentage interest was not reduced to any
extent, family hostility cannot be taken into account.'12 4
The opinion in Metzger Trust is puzzling because there is no issue in
that case concerning attribution among hostile family members. The
redemption in question was of stock owned by a trust. The only
shareholders remaining after the redemption vere friendly family
members and trusts for their behalf. The redemptions had separated
the hostile family members from co-ownership of the same corpora-
tion. After the redemption, one of the beneficiaries of the trust had
actual or constructive ownership of 100 % of the corporation's stock,
and none of his constructive ownership came from unfriendly parties.
All of the beneficiary's stock was attributed to the trust under section
318(a)(3)(B). There was hostility among the several beneficiaries of
the trust, but that has no bearing on the treatment of a redemption of
the trust's stock. While the taxpayers raised the hostility issue, the true
thrust of their claim was that the purpose of the redemption was to
sever connections between hostile shareholders; and the Supreme
Court's decision in Davis precludes resort to a legitimate purpose test
in applying section 302(b)(1).
Six Tax Court judges concurred with the result reached by the
majority in Metzger Trust,2-5 and five of those judges joined in an
121. Robin Haft Trust v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 398, 403 (1973), vacated, 510
F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1975).
122. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
123. 76 T.C. at 62-64.
124. Id. at 59-60.
125. Judges Chabot, Tannenwald, Fay, Irwin, Sterrett and Hall concurred with
the result reached by the majority. Id. at 80, 84.
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opinion written by Judge Tannenwald.12 In his concurring opinion,
Judge Tannenwald criticized the majority for seeking to resolve the
hostility question when the issue was not before them on the facts.1 7
In addition, the judge saw little virtue in the majority's distinction
between cases where the taxpayer's actual and constructive ownership
was reduced to some extent from those where it was not. While Judge
Tannenwald did not attempt to resolve the merits of the hostility
issue, his opinion does suggest that he and the four judges who joined
him lean towards treating hostility as a proper factor to be considered.
2. Redemption of Non-voting Stock
The redemption of non-voting preferred stock by a corporation
where the shareholder had no control over the decision to redeem and
where the redemption is disproportionate to voting stock holdings is
the very circumstance that the Senate gave as an illustration of the
need to have a flexible exception to dividend treatment in the 1954
Code. 128  The determination of whether a shareholder lacks control
should rest on the same principles as were discussed above in connec-
tion with the redemption of voting stock.
If after applying attribution a shareholder owns only non-voting
preferred stock, a redemption of all or any part of the shareholder's
stock ordinarily will be covered by section 302(b)(1).129 Since the
shareholder has no voting interest, the reduction in his right to partici-
pate in dividend distributions and in liquidating distributions cannot
be compensated by the exercise of control, and so the redemption will
constitute a meaningful reduction in his interest. If the shareholder
had effective control of the corporation, even though he had no voting
stock, because of voting stock held by the friendly family members,
perhaps a redemption of the shareholder's non-voting stock would not
qualify as a purchase. 130
126. Judges Fay, Irwin, Sterrett and Hall agreed with the concurring opinion
written by Judge Tannenwald. Id. at 84.
127. Id. at 84 (Tannenwald, J., concurring).
128. 1954 Senate Report, supra note 78, at 44, reprinted in 1954 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News at 4675.
129. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(a) (1955); see Rev. Rul. 77-426, 1977-2 C.B. 87 (re-
demption of non-voting preferred stock held by shareholder who owned no common
stock was treated as a purchase under § 302(b)(1)). Of course, the redemption of
section 306 stock may be treated as a § 301 distribution. I.R.C. § 306(a)(2).
130. In Private Letter Ruling No. 8133093, (May 22, 1981), X owned all of the
voting stock and 60.5% of the non-voting stock of a corporation. The remaining
39.5% of the corporation's non-voting stock was held by Y and by a trust for Y. X
and Y were brother and sister. The corporation redeemed all of the non-voting shares
held by Y and some of the shares held by the trust. After the redemption, Y had
constructive ownership (and the trust had actual ownership) of 31.6% of the corpo-
ration's npn-voting stock. The Commissioner ruled that the redemption lacked divi-
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If, after the redemption is completed, a shareholder has actual or
effective control over the corporation, the redemption of such share-
holder's non-voting stock should not qualify under section 302(b)(1)
since the shareholder's control provides him a means of substituting
for the loss of dividend and liquidation rights. The current treatment
of such redemptions is far from clear.
In a pre-Davis ruling, the Commissioner determined that the re-
demption for good business reasons of all of a corporation's outstand-
ing non-voting preferred stock was covered by section 302(b) (1) where
there "was no proportional relationship or pattern of stock ownership
existing between the holders of the preferred stock and the holders of
the common stock of the corporation." 3 1 Before the redemption, the
corporation's principal shareholder had actual or constructive owner-
ship of sixty percent of the corporation's common stock, and actual
ownership of three percent of its preferred. The redemption of the
preferred stock that he owned outright was treated as a purchase
under section 302(b)(1). The ruling is suspect because, in one sense,
the principal shareholder is in a better position after the redemption
than before since, as a consequence of the redemption, the common
stock that he owned outright, comprising fifty percent of the out-
standing stock, was immunized from the senior interests of the pre-
ferred shares in which he had previously participated only to a small
degree. Moreover, his control over the corporation empowers him to
compensate himself from the corporation for any loss that he suffered
from the redemption of his preferred shares.
When, both with and without applying section 318 attribution, a
shareholder's non-voting stock is held in substantially different pro-
portion to his voting stock holdings and when the shareholder lacks
even effective control of the corporation, a redemption of any or all of
his non-voting shares should qualify for non-dividend equivalence. If,
by virtue of section 302(b)(1), a redemption of a shareholder's voting
stock is treated as a purchase, a simultaneous redemption of that
shareholder's non-voting stock should be given similar treatment. 32
3. Section 302(b)(1)-A Proper Construction
In many cases, the uncertainties of the non-dividend equivalence
test make it too hazardous an exception to rely on for planning pur-
dend equivalence and so constituted a purchase under § 302(b)(1). The question of
effective control was not discussed in that ruling, although the issue lurks in the
stated facts. The ruling also does not indicate whether a friendly relationship existed
between X and Y.
131. Rev. Rul. 68-547, 1968-2 C.B. 123. Presumably the stock was not section 306
stock.
132. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-3(a) (1955) (when voting common stock is redeemed
under the protection of § 302(b)(2), a simultaneous redemption of non-voting pre-
ferred stock will also be treated as an exchange).
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poses. The scope of the test is unclear, and even if agreement is
reached on the proper standard to employ, the application rests
largely on the resolution of factual issues. The difficulties of applying
section 302(b)(1) are such that it might well be a subject for legislative
modification; but in its current form, it has broader application than
some commentators would like. If the 1954 Code provision for non-
dividend equivalence was intended by Congress to be limited to non-
pro rata redemptions of non-voting stock where the shareholder lacks
control of the corporation, Congress certainly wrote the statute in a
most peculiar way. Contrary to limiting the scope of section
302(b)(1), Congress adopted extremely broad language, "essentially
equivalent to a dividend," that mirrors the broadly construed section
115(g) of the 1939 Code; and as previously noted, there is a statement
in the legislative history that the construction of section 115(g)(1) of
the 1939 Code should apply as well to section 302(b)(1) of the 1954
Code. While a proper construction of the 1954 Code provision almost
certainly is narrower than that of the 1939 Code provision, neither the
language employed in section 302(b)(1) nor its legislative history lends
much support for treating this exception as inconsequential.
CONCLUSION
The treatment of stock redemptions under section 302(b) is in a
state of flux. The certainty and predictability of one of the safe harbor
provisions has suffered some strain recently as a consequence of the
Tax Court's liberal application, and the Fifth Circuit's overly gen-
erous application, of the waiver of attribution provision. If the Tax
Court's position is adopted by the Commissioner and by other courts,
a number of serious problems of administration and of judicial con-
struction will have to be resolved.
The not essentially equivalent to a dividend standard has proven to
possess far more vitality than was generally believed after the Su-
preme Court's decision in Davis, and the expansion of the significance
of that provision has raised issues that previously lay dormant. The
extent to which stocks held by friendly family members not within the
limited family relationships described in section 318 should be taken
into account, and the jural significance of hostility among persons
within the section 318 definition of family are just two of the unre-
solved questions.
When the resolution of an issue hinges on factual determinations,
each case will turn on the circumstances there involved. As previously
noted, while such an ad hoc administration provides flexibility, it
impairs the predictability of consequences. After a number of judicial
decisions have been made, however, courts typically will be unwilling
to depart from the results reached in prior decisions and so what was
originally a flexible standard will become increasingly rigid and pre-
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cise. 133 In time, it is likely that section 302(b)(1), if unamended, will
become just as mechanical and precise as are the safe harbor provi-
sions that it was designed to ameliorate.
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Dedication
On October 30, 1981, Dean Joseph M. McLaughlin was sworn in as
Judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York. His departure inspires sorrow for our loss and gratitude
for all that he has done. With best wishes for great success in his
new undertaking,







UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT NEW YORK
Buturum Imposuisti Pani Tuo,
Nunc Ibi Dormi.
DEAN JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN:
TWENTY YEARS OF EXCELLENCE
William Hughes Mulligan *
L am pleased to join the Editors of the Law Review in saluting
Dean Joseph M. McLaughlin, who is leaving the hallowed halls
of academe to become a Judge in the United States District Court,
Eastern District of New York.
Joe's association with Fordhan University has been long and fruit-
ful. After graduating from Fordham College in 1954 and from
Fordham Law School in 1959, Joe joined the Law School faculty in
1961; ten years later he became Dean. Due in no small part to Joe's
tireless efforts, the Law School has grown during this twenty year
period, both in size and national stature. Joe has also brought great
honor to the Law School through his widely read and highly influen-
tial work as Chairman of the New York Law Revision Commission, as
author of the practice commentary to the New York Civil Practice
Law and Rules, and as a regular columnist in the New York Law
Journal. The Fordham University community is rightfully proud of
Joe McLaughlin.
Joe first came to my attention when he was Drum Major of the
Fordham Marching Band, a position he earned because of his inability
to play any musical instrument. He was a student of mine at the Law
School in first year in Criminal Law where he attained the highest
grade in the class. The lure of a uniform, however, was too great, and
he left to join the army and serve in Korea. Upon his return, I offered
him a scholarship to keep him from making the military a career. His
scholastic abilities were outstanding and included the Editorship of
this Review. I enticed him to leave private practice and join the
faculty; I protected him against the blandishments of other Deans
who sought his services and ardently supported him as my successor as
Dean of the Law School. Now that I have left the Federal Bench, he is
joining it. I assume that if I ever leave Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher
& Flom, he will join that firm. I feel somewhat responsible for his
successful legal career, which most people attribute to his ability,
industry, wit and general excellence. In recognition of my role in the
success he has achieved, he continues to address me as "Dean" and has
found it impossible, he says, to use any more familiar terms, or even
"Your Worship," which I prefer.
Joe McLaughlin has all of the qualities which make for outstanding
success in our profession. He is an extremely hard worker, a true
scholar of the law with a firm foundation in the classics. He is one of
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the best teachers of law in the history of this Law School, which has
known many, and his bar review courses and seminars for state court
judges have broadened the reputation he has earned here at Fordham.
He is a superb speaker, has a ready wit and has continued the progress
of the Law School. Though replacing him as Dean will be most
difficult, I am sure that, as a member of the Federal judiciary, Joe
will continue to enhance the School's growing reputation for excel-
lence. We know that the qualities of mind and heart, which have
marked his professional life to date, will lead to a successful career on
the Bench.
Ad Multos Annos.
